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Calvinist Natural Law and
Constitutionalism
CONSTANCE YOUNGWON LEE t
I. Abstract
The continuity between Calvinist natural law and the constitutional tradition of limited
government is often overlooked. This article aims to engage with Calvin's natural law
theory on its own terms to explore what authority it can provide for modern
constitutionalism. The article begins by exploring some important points of distinction
between Calvinist and Thomist approaches to the idea of natural law. I then contend
that the focus of modern constitutionalism on subjecting government power to the 'rule
of law' is continuous with Calvinist natural law concepts of human depravity and
God's sovereignty. The article is structured broadly into three main parts. The first
section engages with the concept and history of Christian natural law, framing them by
reference to the Two Kingdoms doctrine. The second section discusses the central
tenets of Calvinist natural law theory, namely the sovereignty of God, the doctrine of
humanity's total depravity and the Two Kingdoms doctrine as a unified concept. The
final section then applies Calvinist natural law to three sites of modem
constitutionalism - the rule of law, the separation of powers, and modem federalism.
II. Introduction
Few states in the world wish to be perceived as unconstitutional.1 If a constitutional
government is one that pursues constitutionalism in the philosophical sense then it is
safe to say that constitutionalism characteristically concerns the division and limitation
of institutional powers.2 Constitutionalism posits that limits be placed on the 'powers
of rulers by subordinating them to enduring rules that they themselves cannot
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Augusto Zimmermann, 'The Christian Foundations of the Rule of Law in the West: a
Legacy of Liberty and Resistance against Tyranny' (2005) 19(2) Journal of Creation
67, 68; Suri Ratnapala, 'The Idea of a Constitution and Why Constitutions Matter'
[Summer 1999/2000] Policy Magazine 1, 3.
2 Ratnapala, above n 1.
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abrogate'.' In short, constitutionalism recognises the need for constitutional restraints
on arbitrary power.4 Rulers ought to be subject to a 'higher power' that is itself
immune from abuse.5 In this way, the concept of constitutionalism cannot be untwined
from the ideal of the 'rule of law' which declares that there is no person above the
law.6 What the rule of law aims to ensure in practice is that people's rights in respect
to liberty, life and property are not threatened by the arbitrary whim or fancy of
governing officials.
Constitutionalism and the rule of law are further supported by other
constitutional doctrines, such as the separation of powers and federalism. The
institutional divisions imposed on government powers which create separate arms and
different levels of government provide a complex system of formal and informal
checks and balances that safeguards the rule of law.8 The structure of the constitutional
text in Australia, for example, clearly evidences recognition of and respect for the
separation of powers concept. The first three chapters of the Australian Constitution
are set out to reflect the three arms of government with the implication that each
functions critically towards and independently of the others.9 James Madison and
Alexander Hamilton, leading drafters of the United States Constitution, expressed
respect for the same concept in the Federalist Papers some 100 years prior to the
Australian Constitution in 1901.10
Federalism ensures that legislative power balance is not polarised in favour of
the centre by establishing a system that divides the power between the states and the
central polity. The Preamble to the Australian Constitution expressly notes the federal
division of powers between the states and the Commonwealth. Several sections of the
Constitution expressly or impliedly support a strong federal model. For example, the
Constitution expressly limits the Commonwealth's powers to the fields specified in s
3~ Jonathan Crowe and Suri Ratnapala, Australian Constitutional Law: Foundations
and Theory (Oxford University Press, 3 ed, 2012) 3.
4 Ibid 3.
5 Ibid 3-4.
6 Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law (Yale University Press, revised ed, 1965) Ch. 2.
7 Entick v Carrington & Ors [1765] EWHC KB J98.
8 Crowe and Ratnapala, above n 3, 12-13.
9 R v. Kirby; Exparte Boilermakers'Society ofAustralia [1956] HCA 10.
10 James Madison, The Federalist Papers no. 51 and no. 47 (1788).
11 Nicholas Aroney, The Constitution of a Federal Commonwealth (Cambridge
University Press, 2009) 4. Here, Nicholas Aroney provides a comprehensive
historical summary of federalism as conceptualised in Australia and questions
whether the idea of sovereignty was at the core of federalist concerns. He questions
the value of the approach where federalism is viewed essentially to preserve 'a
division of powers' according to the views of A.V. Dicey, James Bryce and K.C.
Wheare. Unlike other instances, the Australian model of federalism arose not out of a
nation needing to be divided up but rather separate states coming together and
deciding to unite under the Commonwealth banner.
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51 and other provisions. 12 The concept of intergovernmental immunities, developed by
the High Court in decisions like Melbourne Corporation v Commonwealth,13 arose
from ss. 106 and 107 of the Constitution.1 4 The Engineers Case1 5 reconfigured the
balance of federal powers significantly in favour of the Commonwealth, 16 but the High
Court has subsequently revised the Engineers doctrine in some respects in an effort to
rebuild the federalist structure in Australia.
1 7
This essay examines the philosophical foundations for the notion of
constitutionalism and its supporting doctrines of the rule of law, the separation of
powers and federalism. It does so by exploring the framework of Christian natural law
set out in the writings of John Calvin.
Calvin's view of positive law is inextricably linked to his belief in the necessity
of civil government in the context of humankind's 'total depravity'."s This reality also
provides the foundation for Calvin's natural law position. Calvin's firm belief in the
corrupt nature of human beings explains his demand for limits to be placed on the civil
government, requiring that all laws flowing from it are to be subject to a higher
morality. On this view, the existence of a transcendent moral norm is necessary to
protect individuals from an ever-present tyranny. Calvin finds this higher morality in
his uncompromising belief in a sovereign God. His revisions to the Two Kingdoms
12 For example, s 109 (provides for the resolution of conflict between State and Cth
laws, the Cth law prevails), s 90 (confers exclusive power to the Cth legislature in
regard to excise and customs duties), s 52 (lists subject matters in the exclusive
control of the Cth parliament) etc.
13 Melbourne Corporation v Commonwealth (1947) 74 CLR 31.
14 D 'Emden v Pedder (1904) 1 CLR 91; See Griffith J's argument that s 107 manifests
an intention by the framers' of the Australian Constitution to adopt the US doctrine
of intergovernmental immunities.
15 Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd (1920) 28 CLR
129.
16 Greg Craven, 'Cracks in the Faqade of Literalism: Is there an Engineer in the
House?' (1992) 18 University of Melbourne Law Review 540.
17 Melbourne Corporation v Commonwealth (1947) 74 CLR 31.
is The depravity doctrine refers to the common Reformed Christian doctrine that
establishes universal human fallibility as the descriptive position for its natural law.
This doctrine as envisaged by Calvin becomes the basis for the modern concept of
social contract theory. Calvin's doctrine of human fallibility had strong influence on
modern liberal philosophers like John Locke. For example, John Locke premises his
idea of social contract theory on what he considered the axiom of human will and its
inherent depravity. Locke stated that individuals are conferred differing degrees of
power which, by their conscience, they must utilise in a way that is most consistent
with the natural law ('God's measure'). His emphasis therefore lies on the duty that is
begotten by individual freedoms. Further, the need for a social contract between
fallible individuals and the state, which is itself composed of fallible individuals,
finds support in Calvin's account of human fallibility. See John Locke, Two Treatises
of Government, Ch. 2, § 4-8.
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doctrine19 render it to mean that both spiritual and civil laws are subject to God's
ultimate authority, and this constitutes the universality of accountability and
entitlement that is the cornerstone of natural law. Any human being, whether subject or
ruler, who falls short of this higher morality which is embodied in a perfect God is
adjudged by a transcendent measure. It is thus evident that Calvin's natural law cannot
be untwined from his theology. However, my exploration of his theology, for the most
part, is done in the hope of distilling the principles underlying his natural law position.
In this way, I hope to demonstrate the congruence between Christian natural law and
the ideal of constitutionalism thus, confirming the continuing relevance of natural law
jurisprudence to today's world.
This paper aims to engage with Calvin's natural law theory on its own terms to
explore what support it can provide for modern constitutionalism. The paper is divided
into three parts. The first section explores the concept and history of Christian natural
law framed in terms of the Two Kingdoms doctrine. The second section discusses the
central tenets of Calvinist natural law theory namely, the sovereignty of God, the
doctrine of humanity's total depravity and the Two Kingdoms as a unified concept.
The third section will then go on to apply Calvinist natural law to three sites of modern
constitutionalism - the rule of law, the separation of powers, and modem federalism.
III. A History of Christian Natural Law
The influence of natural law theories on modern legal and political philosophical
design is rarely disputed. However, the subtle distinctions between different versions
of natural law thought are frequently overlooked. In particular, a distinctively
Protestant development of natural law is largely lacking. Contemporary discussions of
natural law tend to focus strongly on the work of John Finnis since he (and the other
Inew natural law theorists') has developed detailed analyses of the implications of
natural law for specific legal and political questions. 20 However, he does so from
within a Catholic and Thomist perspective. 2' The fact that modern theologians,
especially those espousing the Protestant faith, have on the whole been wary of
developing a distinctively Protestant account of natural law has left a rich source
fallow.
22
19 The Two Kingdoms doctrine refers to Reformed Christian tradition that distinguishes
between the heavenly realm and the earthly realm, aiming to show the two-fold
manner in which God governs the world. See Diarmaid MacCulloch, The
Reformation: A History (Penguin, 2003).
20 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2011).21 The natural law jurisprudence of Finnis classified substantially the same as that of the
Catholic Church. See Peter M. Cicchino, 'Reason and the Rule of Law: Should Bare
Assertions of 'Public Morality' Qualify as Legitimate Government Interests for the
Purposes of Equal Protection Review?' (1998) 87(1) Georgetown Law Journal 139,
139, 157, 162, 164.
22 Jean Porter, Natural & Divine Law: Reclaiming the Tradition for Christian Ethics
(Win. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1999) Ch. 1.
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This section places Protestant natural law thought within a broader historical and
philosophical context in order to make clear its distinctive contribution. It is useful to
begin by exploring the basic concept of a Christian natural law theory. First, the
'natural' component of the concept alludes to natural law's scope of influence. The
recognition of the universality of the 'unwritten law' on the hearts of humans 23 holds
all humans to account for their actions. In other words, there is a binding moral duty on
all humans by virtue of their inherent humanity. It follows that such a moral imperative
as dictated by human conscience is universal.24 No person is exempt from such a moral
duty. Second, the 'law' part of the term signifies the transcendent and binding
26
character of natural law. Natural law is distinguishable from positive law in that it is
the higher standard by which the former is to be adjudged in order to determine
27
whether it is law in the true sense. Christian jurists claim that natural law is the
embodiment of principles of morality and justice which are applicable regardless of
282time and condition. For Finnis and Grisez,29 for example, the normative force of
natural law comes ultimately from its divine origins, even though they sometimes
present their views in secular form.30
From a Christian perspective, natural law is continuous with what God has done
in creation." This continuity between natural law and creation has three further
consequences. First, natural law exhibits continuity with the laws of gravity that bind
all beasts and humans alike through the practical order of causality.32 Second, it
constitutes epistemological precepts and prepositions that are not contrary to human
logic or reason. Third, it is the ordinances of a divine lawgiver and, therefore, it does
not contradict the word of God.33 These tenets of the Christian natural law definition
are significant. For example, the first expounds on what it means to be 'human' by
suggesting that humans are the only entities capable of evil. Beasts do not sin because
23 Russell Hittinger, The First Grace: Rediscovering the Natural Law in a Post-
Christian World, (ISI Books, 2007) xiii.
24 Edward S. Corwin, The Higher Law: Background of American Constitutional Law
(Cornell University Press, 1955) 45.
25 English Standard Version Psalm 19; Romans 2:12.
26 'The 'lex' in the term 'lex naturalis' is derived from the term 'ligare' to bind or to
oblige. 'See eg Aquinas, above n 26, I-I1 q.90 a.1; Hittinger, above n 23, Ch. 2.
27 Ibid.
28 Zimmermann, above n 28, 12.
29 Germain Grisez, 'The First Principle of Practical Reason: a Commentary on the
Summa Theologiae, I-II Question 94, a.2' (1965) 10 Natural Law Forum 192-193.
30 J. Budziszewski, Written on the Heart: The Case for Natural Law (Intervarsity Press,
1997) 196.
31 Jonathan Burnside, God, Justice and Society: Aspects of Law and Legality in the
Bible (Oxford University Press, 2011) 69; Suri Ratnapala, Jurisprudence (Cambridge
University Press, 2009).
32 Hittinger, above n 23, 4.
32 'Participatio legis aetemae in rationali creatura'. See Aquinas, above n 26, I-II, q. 91,
a.2.
33 Hittinger, above n 23, 4.
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they are naturally subject to the laws of God.3 4 The second facet - the claim that
every human possesses the capacity to distinguish evil from good - reinforces the idea
that natural law is universally accessible to human beings by virtue of their
consciences,3 5 calling all humans (Christians and non-Christians) to account for their
36actions. Thirdly, though the law of God as imprinted on human hearts can serve as a
compass to the moral life, Christian natural law elevates the Scriptures as the
immutable, eternal and paramount truth)
A. THE QUESTION OF THE TWO KINGDOMS
It can be strongly argued that the modern natural law tradition originated in (or at least
was heavily shaped by) Christian philosophy, through the influence of Augustine,
Aquinas, Grotius and others.38 The above definition is framed in such a way as to
encapsulate the common ground of both the Thomist and Reformed accounts of
Christian natural law. However, I will now seek to draw out the more subtle
differences between them. One useful way of framing the distinction is through the
doctrine of the Two Kingdoms.
Discussion of the Two Kingdoms doctrine so intersperses early Reformed
natural law thought that the development of the two cannot be entirely separated. In
affirming this doctrine, traditional Christian jurists constructed natural law upon the
principle of God's supremacy over both heavenly (spiritual) and earthly (civil)
kingdoms. For our present purposes, the Two Kingdoms idea will be treated as the
primary lens through which Christian natural law tradition is reviewed. Despite the
vast and vibrant array of Christian natural-law approaches that have emerged over the
ages, the Two Kingdoms doctrine remains a core doctrine that threads the diverse
theories together. Furthermore, the different forms of the doctrine in Thomist and
Reformed natural law theories provide a useful way of distinguishing the two
traditions.
In contemporary scholarship, the Two Kingdoms doctrine has fallen from
favour with adherents of Reformed Christianity.3 9 The marginalisation of the Two
Kingdoms doctrine in this manner has consigned Christian natural law to a purely
spiritual dimension of Reformed Christian thought. By viewing the Two Kingdoms in
34 Anton-Herman Chroust, 'Natural Law and 'According to Nature' in Ancient
Philosophy' (1978) 23(1) American Journal of Jurisprudence 73; More accurately, it
can be said that humans are the only entities capable of sinning because they are the
only ones endowed with free-will.
35 Aquinas, above n 26, I-II, q.94, a.2.
36 Ibid.
37 Anton-Herman Chroust, 'The Fundamental Ideas in St. Augustine's Philosophy of
Law' (1973) 18 American Journal of Jurisprudence 57, 69.
38 J. Daryl Charles, Retrieving the Natural Law: A Return to Moral First Things (Wm.
B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2008) 103.
39 David VanDrunen, Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms (Wm. B. Eerdmans
Publishing Co., 2010) 1-3.
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terms of the sharp separation between Church and state, the didactic value of this
doctrine has lost considerable effectiveness. In this context, it is part of the purpose of
my present research to reclaim and revise the Two Kingdoms doctrine as an important
building block to Christian natural law. This involves, firstly, revisiting and
recognising the significance of the Two Kingdoms doctrine for the development of a
Reformist account of natural law; and, secondly, framing the relationship of the Two
Kingdoms in such a way as to align them with the most robust version of that tradition.
To this end, I will suggest that the Two Kingdoms doctrine is a misnomer.4 To
suggest that the heavenly kingdom and the earthly kingdom are two separate realms is
to give rise to the inference that they hold equivalent status. Such an inference
necessarily undermines the idea that natural law is a transcendent and external moral
standard for life in the civil kingdom. The historical overview that follows seeks to
draw out the conclusion that one of the most potent distinctions between Thomist and
Reformed accounts of Christian natural law is sourced in their answers to this precise
question. I hope to reclaim the original vision of the doctrine found in Augustine,
where the heavenly kingdom is the only authoritative kingdom and is the framework
within which the fallen state of humanity as represented by the earthly kingdom is
contrasted and adjudged. Augustine's theory, by emphasising God's supremacy, gives
rise to one overarching source of natural law. Through its affirmation, original
Reformed theorists were able to root political and cultural life securely in God's work
of providence (rather than his work of grace through Jesus Christ) thereby holding both
believers and non-believers universally to account. This emphasis on the true,
authoritative kingdom has been obscured in more recent theological approaches.
B. PRE-REFORMATION CHRISTIAN NATURAL LAW
1. AUGUSTINE OF HIPPO (354-430)
Saint Augustine of Hippo's contribution to Christian natural law is foundational.4 1 As
the founder of the idea that theological considerations constitute the only sound Church
recognises his theology as the premise for true law and true jurisprudence. No doubt he
facilitated a once secular-theistic discipline of jurisprudence which became firmly
rooted in a theological framework.42 Augustine's central focus lies in the 'sovereignty
of God' .4 Though he was inspired by pagan philosophers, particularly the works of
40 Renowned Theologians like D.A. Carson represent the popular modern Reformist
dismissal of the Two Kingdoms doctrine as a purely Lutheran construct. See eg D.A.
Carson, Christ & Culture Revisited (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008) 218.
41 John Piper, The legacy of Sovereign Joy (Good News Publishers, 2005) 44. The irony
is that Augustine's work appealed to oppositional forces. The Roman Catholic
Church consulted him and venerated him as a Saint but the Protestant Reformation
(the Catholic counter-revolution) ultimately derived their force from his texts.
42 Zimmermann, above n 28, 12.
43 Piper, above n 41, 57-62. Note eg Pelagius (Augustine's lifelong opponent) quotes
Augustine's book On the Freedom of the Will against him as he is appalled when he
reads in Augustine's confession, an apparent contradiction 'Give me the grace [0
Lord] to do as you command, and command me to do what you will!'. See
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Cicero and later Plato and Aristotle,4 4 he employs these theories within clear limits.
Divine Providence, he states, has allowed both believers and non-believers alike to
access speculative reasoning abilities (summa ratio)45 and, in this way, he consolidates
the thesis that natural law is applicable equally to all humans. It is the universality
characterising his natural law approach which effectively distinguishes him from his
Hellenistic and Stoic predecessors.46
It is when Augustine discovers Apostle Paul's gospel through Bishop
Ambrose4 that he sees the limits besieging human reason and emphatically4 8 notes that
humans must necessarily appeal to the Scriptures as the paramount source of moral
guidance:
49
I thrilled with love and dread alike. I realized that I was far away
from you ... and, far off, I heard your voice saying I am the God
who IS. I heard your voice, as we hear voices that speak to our
hearts, and at once I had no cause to doubt.50
This transcendence of divine will characterising Augustine's natural law outlook
grounds the medieval natural law tradition upon two fundamental principles. Firstly,
that unity is derived from God and involves one faith, one Church and one empire.51
And, secondly, the supremacy of the law which is not a human creation but rather
conceived as part of the unity of the universe. In The City of God,52 Augustine
formulates the Two Kingdoms doctrine where he draws a sharp separation between
temporal law (lex temporalis) and the divine law (lex aeterna),53 elevating the latter
above the former. The implication of the clear separation between positive and divine
Augustine, Confessions, (Ch. X, 31) 236. Augustine saw that we cannot choose what
we find delight in. He saw God as a self-evident good that left us no choice but to
find delight in nothing other than Him alone. Note that freedom is redefined so as to
mean the ability to gain so much spiritual discernment regarding God's beauty and so
in love with God that one is able to transcend the place where we rate God as a
parallel to any other alternative choice.
44 Chroust, above n 37, 57, 69.
45 H.L.A Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961) 183f. The
appeal of natural law lies in the fact that it is divorceable from theological
considerations? Human law can be separated from divine law? This is challengeable.
See eg Zimmermann, above n 28, 12.
46 Chroust, above n 37, 57, 69.
47 Piper, above n 41, 49; St. Augustine, Confessions, V: 16.
48 St. Augustine, The Confessions, VII: 10.
49 St. Augustine, above n 49, XII:2; Exodus 3:14.
50 Augustine's call to delight in God for his sake alone, in other words, worshipping
God as the self-evident good. See St. Augustine, The Confessions, VII: 10.
51 St. Augustine, Writings Against the Manichaeans and against the Donatists, XII: 18;
Ephesians 4:5.
52 St. Augustine, above n 49, V:15-17.
53 St Augustine, On the Free Choice of the Will, 1:6; Chroust, above n 37, 57, 68.
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laws as Augustine famously stated is that 'an unjust law would seem to be no law at
all' .54
Accordingly, where positive laws flout natural law, the law 'so-called' loses its
legal validity. By this, Augustine warns us of the inherent ethical danger of conflating
positive law with natural justice. The notion that natural law is grounded in the
Scriptures and, correlatively, that only human reason that is congruent with the divine
law as revealed through the Scriptures ought to have normative force has rendered
theology inseparable from legal and political considerations.56
As noted above, Augustine's emphasis on the supremacy of divine law makes
the 'Two Kingdoms doctrine' something of a misnomer. It is clear that, for him, there
is only one true kingdom constituted by divine law. The temporal or civil law found in
the earthly kingdom enjoys authority only insofar as it is consistent with the divine
will. Augustine therefore emphasises that the earthly kingdom that disregards divine
will is no true kingdom at all.
Anyone ambitious enough to attempt a summary of Augustine's influence is
bound to 'disclaim thoroughness' .58 Traces of his work trickle through politics,
psychology, philosophy, poetry and literature59 but course through theology (as a pre-
cursor to both Catholic and Reformed thought) and natural law theories. As such,
Augustine's version of the Two Kingdoms doctrine provides the basic scaffolding for
subsequent natural law development sixteen centuries later. His texts, therefore, remain
the most apt starting point for an overview of Christian natural law tradition.
2. THOMAS AQUINAS (1225-1274)
It is, however, Thomas Aquinas' account of natural law that has claimed most
influential to jurists in the last seven centuries.60 Considered paradigmatic of Christian
natural law,61 it has been upheld as the official natural law doctrine of the Catholic
Church and, therefore, deserves closer inspection. The compelling nature of Aquinas'
version of natural law can be attributed to his success in synthesising Augustinian
62theology with Aristotelian philosophy.
In his Summa Theologica, Aquinas subtly diluted Augustine's Two Kingdoms
doctrine by placing positive law in the broader context of natural law as part of God's
54 St Augustine, On the Free Choice of the Will, 1:5:11:33.
55 St. Augustine, above n 49, IV:1-4.
56 Jean Porter, Nature as Reason: A Thomistic Theory of the Natural Law (Win. B.
Eerdmans Publishing co., 2005) 12.
57 St. Augustine, On Order, 11.7.21; Chroust, above n 37, 63-64.
58 Piper, above n 41, 45.
59 Ibid 25, 44.
60 VanDrunen, above n 39, 43.
61 Zimmermann, above n 28, (Butterworths, 2012) 13.
62 Ibid 13.
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overall design for the universe. 63 Augustine's strict separation between the kingdom of
God and the kingdom of humans, the external and internal order of things, and the
transcendence of the former above the latter are all relatively weakened. Instead,
Aquinas defines human law as 'an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by
him who has care of the community, and promulgated' .64
Aquinas identifies four types of law: eternal, natural, human and divine. Eternal
law reflects the timelessness of God and therefore represents the will of God
concerning all creation. Eternal law is comprised of both scientific laws, including
laws of physics, mathematics and logic as well as the practical and moral laws that
govern human conduct.6' Aquinas goes on to develop Augustine's theory by dividing
eternal law into two sub-categories: divine law and natural law. By divine law, he
refers to that part of eternal law attained through divine revelation through the
Scriptures, which he then differentiates from natural law: the part of eternal law
66discoverable by human reason alone. Human law is then able to be derived from
67
natural law through the exercise of what he calls practical reason. The derivation of
human laws from precepts of natural law is accomplished in two ways: logical
61deduction and specification. In so doing, Aquinas substantially weakens the
separation between natural law and human laws. If the role of human laws is to
effectively supplement and specify natural laws, the necessary implication is that they
are working symbiotically and the transcendence of one above the other is significantly
downplayed.
Aquinas agrees with Augustine that a human law that contradicts the 'ordinance
of reason' cannot enforce compliance. However, he introduces a caveat in cases where
the risks of disobedience amount to undermining the whole legal order (and therefore
the common good). In this sense, Aquinas subscribes to the 'weak natural law thesis'
as Mark C. Murphy calls it.6 9 Finnis, a natural law theorist who largely elaborated on
Aquinas's theory for modem use, also identifies with the weak natural law thesis.
Finnis states that laws that fall short of moral standards are precluded from being a law
in the technical sense. Immoral laws are still laws; they are just 'defective laws'. °
Furthermore, if disobedience to a defective or unjust law of the kind just mentioned
means injury to the legal system as a whole, it ought to be obeyed. 1
63 Aquinas, above n 26, I-II, Q 93, art 3.
64 Ibid I-II, Q 90, art 4.
65 Jonathan Crowe, Legal Theory (Thomson Reuters, 2nd ed, 2013) 26.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Mark C. Murphy, 'The Explanatory Role of the Weak Natural Law Thesis', in Will
Waluchow and Stefan Sciaraffa (eds), Philosophical Foundations of the Nature of
Law (Oxford University Press, 2013) Ch. 1.
70 Finnis, above n 20, 363-366.
71 Plato describing the last days of Socrates' life in the Phaedo recounts the nature of
Socrates' death under an unjust law. When offered a chance to escape with his life,
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The effect of elevating the common good over divine law is perhaps a logical
consequence of integrating positive law into the framework of divine law. Practical
reason (as imprinted on all human consciences) leads us to comply with natural law
allowing us to discern right from wrong. Aquinas holds that, as rational creatures,
human beings 'participate' with God's eternal laws72 ,in a most excellent way.' 3 As
such, he conceives natural law as encompassing both physical laws and normative
rules of human conduct.7 4 By emphasising the 'God-given natural faculty of the human
mind', Aquinas strives to demonstrate the intrinsic correlation of natural law (reason)
to divine law (revelation). 6 Humans, for Aquinas, have an inherent capacity to attain
knowledge of natural law and shape their human laws accordingly. The earthly
kingdom therefore takes on its own form of legitimacy, rather than being clearly
subordinate.
C. REFORMED CHRISTIAN NATURAL LAW
1. LUTHERANISM
At the outset, it may be prudent to distinguish Luther, the man, from Lutheranism, the
movement. German theologian Martin Luther's (1483-1546) influence was
revolutionary. On the theological front, his teachings served as the impetus to the
Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century. On the political front, Lutheranism,
the movement, became the counter-revolutionary force that deposed the authority of
the Catholic Church by challenging the medieval Christian teachings it used to
centralise political power in Rome for almost four centuries.
The value of Luther as a transitional force cannot be underestimated. Luther
believed that the total depravity of humankind, its inherent self-interestedness, imbued
every thought, every action and every want.7 ' Thus, he believed that salvation could
only be achieved by grace through faith alone. To this end, mediation by a priesthood
is both unnecessary and useless as Christ alone can make the impossible possible
through the Scriptures. 7 9 The cornerstone of the Reformation was therefore, a return to
the external Word. 0 In so doing, Luther definitively laid to waste the notion that the
Pope and the Church were the only authoritative repositories of Divine Will,
Socrates decides to obey the 'unjust law' out of, what he considers, a duty under the
'voluntary contract' he committed to with the State. See Crowe, above n 65,15.
72 Aquinas, above n 26, I-11, Q 91, art 2.
73 Ibid I-II, Q 91, art 2.
74 Aquinas' formulation downplays the distinction between conscience and synderesis.
See eg VanDrunen, above n 39, 44.
75 Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution II: The Impact of the Protestant Reformation
on the Western Legal Tradition (Harvard University Press, 2003) 242.
76 Zimmermann, above n 28, (Butterworths, 2012) 14.
77 Berman, The Lutheran Reformation and Western Legal Tradition' (1987) 5:1 Journal
of Law and Religion 177, 177-179.
78 Piper, above n 41, 80.
79 Ibid.
so Ibid.
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effectively categorising them as secondary and fallible to the sovereign and infallible
character of God's external Word. 81
Accordingly, Luther's theory of natural law is best viewed as a reaction to the
papacy that existed at the time and which concentrated the legal and political power in
ecclesiastical authority. 82 Pre-Luther, the world was wedded to the church placing
authority in a single entity.83 The most marked feature of Luther's theory of natural law
is therefore the sharp rending of the church entirely from the state. 84 Luther replaced
the Gregorian Two Swords doctrine, which facilitated the church's 'character as a
sword-wielding entity - a visible, hierarchical, political and legal community', 8 with
his 'Two Governments' theory thus effectively, relegating the church to a purely
private realm.
86
On a superficial level, the distinction between Luther's and Augustine's
versions of the Two Kingdoms doctrine is only subtle. However, the implications
flowing from this distinction are worth considering. In order to resolve the central
dilemma between humankind's wicked nature and temporal authority as ordained by
God, Augustine's Two Kingdoms doctrine reinforces the absolute sovereignty and
transcendence of God's heavenly kingdom.8 In contrast, Luther resolves this dilemma,
in part, by introducing his theory on the 'uses of the law' in which he posits that
temporal authority, in addition to moral law, is just another means of making
individuals 'conscious of their obligations and hence, repentant of their sins'.88
Luther's strained efforts to utterly reject the Thomist tendency to value human
efforts over God's grace 89 renders his doctrine more amenable to mandating
81 Martin Luther, Luther's Works (L W), 36:248.
82 Berman, above n 77, 177-182.
83 VanDrunen, above n 39, 2.
84 Berman, above n 77, 177-178.
85 Ibid 180.
86 Zimmermann, above n 28 (Butterworths, 2012) 14.
87 Note, some view this as a misnomer as essentially, there is only one Kingdom, the
Kingdom of God; however, a better understanding of what Augustine defines as
Christian freedom may resolve this. He describes true freedom as spiritual
discernment to see the Beauty of God and love God more fully; what logically flows
from this is a desire to do God's will. Whether a believer or non-believer, the truth
therefore remains unchanged that God is self-evidently good and therefore, worth
pursuing for His own sake. Whether we choose to pursue this joy or not is left to us.
Note C.S. Lewis' reflection on free will, 'For you will certainly carry out God's
purpose, however you act, but it makes a difference to you whether you serve like
Judas or like John.' See C.S Lewis, The Problem of Pain (Harper Collins, 2002); St.
Augustine, above n 49, V: 7.
88 Berman, above n 77, 177-178.
89 'The temporal power is but a very small matter in the sight of God, and too slightly
regarded by Him for us to resist, disobey, or become quarrelsome on its account, no
matter whether the state does right or wrong. But on the other hand the spiritual
power is an exceedingly great blessing and much too precious in his sight for the very
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individuals' compliance with civil laws on the basis that temporal laws have been
ordained by God.90 Therefore, underlying Luther's theory of the 'uses of the law' in
the temporal realm is his rather convenient and potentially loaded assumption that the
princes (or rulers) are Christians themselves.9 1 By separating the heavenly and earthly
kingdoms, Luther seems to relegate natural law to the shadows of temporal law.
Hence, through Luther's version of the Two Kingdoms doctrine the connection
between religion and law is able to be later preserved in the prince.92 This contrasts
sharply with Augustine's version of the doctrine, as discussed above.
Unfortunately, the practical implication of Luther's natural law theory is that
Lutheranism did not facilitate a complete break from the Roman Catholic tradition of
positing legal and political authority in a human lawmaker. 93 Instead, by assuming and
thereby elevating the conscience and integrity of the ruler whilst simultaneously
stressing the depravity of the subjects to be ruled, authority was concentrated in a
single human lawmaker or an exclusive group of lawmakers.94 Lutherans like Johann
Oldendorp (1486-1567) traced all laws for ordering the earthly kingdom95 to the
Fourth Commandment ('Honor thy father and mother' - the prince being the parent).96
Thus, it is the way that Lutherans framed 'God-ordained legal authority' which appears
conducive to German legal positivism which was to rear its head in successive years.
97
The Lutheran Reformation therefore not only enhanced immeasurably the authority of
the prince but also of the prince's official retinue, the Obrigkeit.98 In short, the legal
reformation in 1500s in Germany may have partly facilitated the transference of
authority from the Holy Roman Empire to the German Emperor, importing
Nationalistic fervour along the way. Though this transfer post-dated the Lutheran
movement, it cannot be entirely divorced from Lutheranism.99 It is a paradox therefore
that through its tendency for 'systematic legal codification' as well as its inherently
'utilitarian' view of law, Lutheranism may be viewed as being largely congenial to
modern legal positivism. 00
least of Christian men to suffer silently when it deviates one hairsbreadth from its
proper function.' See Martin Luther, Treatise on Good Works [1520] LW 44:93.
90 Ibid.
91 Berman, above n 77, 177-178.
92 Ibid 187.
93 'Emphasis is on the direct duty imposed on all human rulers by divine will 'to
maintain discipline, judgment, and peace in accordance with the divine
commandments and rational laws of the land.' The logical deduction from this is that
all humans should be subject to the rule of the Prince. See Philip Melanchton,
Compendaria Dialectices Ration (1520), XX: 615.
94 Berman, above n 75, 65.
95 Weitliches Regiment, 'the secular regime'.
96 Berman, above n 77, 192.
97 Ibid 188.
98 Ibid 187.
99 William J. Wright, Martin Luther's Understanding of God's Two Kingdoms (Baker
Academic, 2010) 31.
100 Berman, above n 77, 187.
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2 JOHN CALVIN (1509-1564)
By general consensus, Calvin (1509-1564) is recognised as a 'one of the greatest but
also, one of the most controversial Christian leaders who ever lived'. °1 Calvin's works
extensively tailored the Protestant Reformed teachings, capitalising on the momentum
initiated by his Reformist predecessors - most notably, Luther. His works, including
his Institutes of Christian Religion, continue to be required reading for ministers and
his commentaries continue to be the most read after the New Testament writers.
10 2
Calvin was not valued for originality as was Augustine, Aquinas or Luther;
nevertheless, no one individual can be considered his equal in lending clarity and
coherence to the Christian message.' ° It is in this respect that Calvin's works emerge
as possibly the richest and most comprehensive source of Reformed Christian natural
law theory.
The 'absoluteness or sovereignty of God' was central to Calvin's theology.
'Nothing mattered more to Calvin than the supremacy of God over all things' .04 This
idea was not new. His predecessors all shared it. However, it was Calvin who
successfully refined and systemised the theology. Equipped by his constancy and
'unremitting zeal', as well as his outstanding intellectual and reasoning abilities, Calvin
made his theology workable. ° Calvin made his loyalty public in 1539, in a scathing
response to Cardinal Sadolet, who had written to the leaders in Geneva with the
objective of winning them back to the Catholic Church. Upon reading Calvin's letter,
Luther said, 'Here is a writing which has hands and feet. I rejoice that God raises up
such men.' 10 6 Calvin's interaction with Sadolet is significant because it reveals the root
of Calvin's opposition to the Catholic Church. He is not preoccupied with the usual
'sticking points' of the Protestant Reformation (its attack of the Catholic Church's
priestly abuses, papal authority, selling of indulgences and so on). Calvin goes straight
to the heart of the issue: God must be supremely glorified in all things. He argued that
even Sadolet's attempts to reinvigorate the people's 'zeal for the eternal', virtuous and
just as they appeared, effectively worked to displace God's rightful position as the
object of all glory.107
This 'supremacy of God' concept translates faithfully into Calvin's theory of
natural law. Prior to becoming a theologian and a reformer, Calvin was a law graduate
from the University of Bourges in 1528.108 As a legal scholar and lawyer, Calvin was a
101 John Piper, John Calvin and his Passion for the Majesty of God (Crossway Books,
2009) 7.
102 Ibid 8.
103 Ibid.
104 Piper, above n 41, 115.
105 Ibid.
106 Henry F. Henderson, Calvin in his Letters (J. M. Dent and Co., 1909) 68.
107 John Calvin, 'Reply by John Calvin to Letter by Cardinal Sadolet to the Senate and
People of Geneva in Tracts, Part I, vole. 1 of John Calvin: Tracts and Letters, ed.
and trans. Henry Beveridge (Calvin Translation Society, 1844) 25-68.108 Zimmermann, above n 28 (Butterworths, 2012) 19.
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proponent of the idea that natural law would constitute absolute principles that ought to
be universally and enduringly applied all society and individuals. Like his
predecessors, Calvin believed that natural law had been written on the hearts of all
humankind by God in the form of their consciences, although full comprehension was
inaccessible in our fallen states.10 9 Calvin concluded that in order to resolve this
problem, God made the most important precepts of natural law accessible through the
written Word of God to teach us more fully and more perfectly about natural law. 1
Like Luther before him, Calvin believed in the role of the law to 'exhort' both
believers and non-believers alike to ongoing obedience. However, he did so within
clear limits.
Calvinism advances the idea that power cannot be centralised in a single entity
without risk of abuse. 1 However, Calvin's separation of temporal and heavenly
realms does not translate to a neat separation between God and state.1 1 2 Thus, Calvin's
'reluctant' involvement in the killing of Michael Servetus does not constitute a
documented lapse in his theology. Rather, Calvin's theological affinity with Augustine
- his emphasis on the 'supremacy of God' - upholds the transcendence of the laws
of the eternal kingdom above temporal laws thereby subjecting human laws to the laws
of God for their validation. Therefore, Calvin's philosophy represents a move back
towards an Augustinian version of the Two Kingdoms doctrine, with its strong
emphasis on divine authority, and away from the emphasis on the inherent authority of
civil law found in both Aquinas and Luther." 3
IV. The tenets of Calvinist natural law
What then are the distinctive features of a 'Calvinist' account of natural law? This
question involves exploring both what Calvin's particular account of natural law
entails and its significance to his overarching theology.1 1 4 At this point, it is useful to
map out the divergent interpretive routes that have originated from Calvin's natural
law theory as noted by scholars of reformed social thought, such as David VanDrunen.
VanDrunen mentions the emergence of two principal strands of Calvinist natural law
109 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, JJ.ii. 12 & 1.3.
110 Ibid 8.1.
111 Zimmermann, above n 28 (Butterworths, 2012) 18.
112 John W. de Gruchy, John Calvin: Christian Humanist and Evangelical Reformer
(Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2013) 107-111.
113 Aquinas and Luther both had their own political philosophies providing for limited
government. However, this article specifically concerns the constitutional ideals that
may be derived from or that bear semblance with Calvin's theological position. A full
discussion of Aquinas' and Luther's positions is therefore beyond the scope of this
article.
114 Richard A. Muller, The Unaccommodated Calvin: Studies in the Foundation of a
Theological Tradition (Oxford University Press, 2000); Susan E. Schreiner, 'Calvin's
Use of Natural Law', in Michael Cromartie (ed), A Preserving Grace: Protestants,
Catholics and Natural Law (Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1997).
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theory.1 15 Proponents of the first strand typically view Calvin's natural law theory as
being peripheral to and possibly inconsistent with his larger theology. They highlight
the apparent discontinuities between Calvin's natural law theory and the theory of both
his Thomist predecessors and his Reformed successors. Proponents of the other strand
of interpretation espouse the continuity of Calvin's natural law theory with both
medieval scholarship and the Reformation, upholding it as crucial to Calvin's larger
theology.!1
6
In order to understand Calvin's natural law theory, we must understand the
complex design of theological concepts that inform his epistemic position.117 It is also
necessary to place Calvin's theory in a wider historical context. The mission of lending
clarity to Calvinist natural law is therefore a perilous one, raising deeper contextual
questions.118 For instance, even regarding a simple concept like humankind's ability to
access natural revelation, Calvin appears at first glance to contradict himself. While
Calvin speaks negatively of humans' knowledge of natural law as irremediably
obscured by sin, he remains openly optimistic that every human being has access to
natural laws as 'engraved upon their hearts'.119 How are such apparently contradictory
remarks to be reconciled? Calvin does this simply and elegantly. Every seeming
discrepancy is unravelled by his confidence in the supremacy of God. However, the
devil lies in the details.
A. THE SOVEREIGNTY OF GOD
One thing is common to all of Calvin's formulations of natural law, namely, the
sovereignty of God. This recurring emphasis on God's ultimate sovereignty places
Calvin in a line of thought stretching back to Augustine. The way in which divine
sovereignty is expressed in Calvin's theory also serves to distinguish him from
Aquinas. T. H. L. Parker notes the 'complete intellectual reversal necessary before
[Calvin] could confidently and joyfully understand the knowledge of the relationship
between subject and object ... and that the intellect, far from moulding the object, is
itself formed to the capacity of the knowledge of the object by the object itself.'120
However fragmented or inconsistent Calvin's statements may appear in
isolation, a closer examination of the theological context in which they were made
reveals that Calvinist natural law finds sense in this emphasis on God's sovereignty.
121
It is the self-evident goodness of God's character that brings cohesion to all forms of
115 VanDrunen, above n 39, 94.
116 Larry D. Sharp, 'The Doctrine of Grace in Calvin and Augustine' [1980] 52 The
Evangelical Quarterly 84, 94.
117 Pryor, above n 117, 225, 241.
118 Schreiner, above n 118, 77.
119 Calvin's Commentaries on Romans 2:14-15; Jeremiah 31:33.
120 T.H.L. Parker, John Calvin: Biography (J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd, 1975) 12.
121 Pryor, above n 117, 225, 241.
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wisdom.1 2 2 Hag-bearers of the Thomist tradition of natural law - including Aquinas
and his modern successors, most notably Finnis - are guilty of both downplaying and
overlooking this aspect of Christian natural law.123 It is not that Aquinas and his
followers deny God's ultimate sovereignty, but the way the Thomist tradition divides
the normative realm into distinct fields contrasts with the unity Augustine and Calvin
derive from God's supremacy as the source of all transcendent norms. 24 This principle
therefore represents the great divide between Thomist and Calvinist interpretations of
natural law.
1. A Matter of Emphasis: Basic Goods or The Ultimate Good?
Aquinas lays down as the absolutely first principle for his theory on practical reason,
'Good is to be done and pursued, and bad avoided' .125 Each of the basic forms of good
characterising Aquinas' natural law possess this 'primariness' which Aquinas refers to
as 'basic' (primum).126 The first principles of practical reason identified by Aquinas are
marked by both self-evidence (per se notum)127  and undeducibility
(indemonstrable).1 28 Aquinas' theory aligns with Augustine in the extent to which it
emphasises the universality of human goods. However, whereas Augustine emphasises
the divine origin of the goods, Aquinas emphasises their self-evidence from the
standpoint of human reason. Aquinas' theory therefore has an inherent disposition to
foreground human understanding of the 'good' rather than its transcendent origins.
Aquinas further notes both that humans may differ in their understanding of the
good and that they may participate in the good in quite different ways. This does not
mean that the 'good' is normatively subjective rather than objective. It is not that some
goods are more self-evident than others, but it may allow the latitude to suggest that
different people may have different ways of participating in the goods, notwithstanding
their self-evident nature.1 29 This point provides a further illustration of how Aquinas
emphasises human understanding of the goods as opposed to the ultimate unity of
purpose reflected in their transcendent origins.
2. Calvin's First Principles
Aquinas' focus on the human understanding of the 'basic goods' shifts the emphasis
from the ultimate good to the limited and often flawed human understanding of the
122 William F. Keesecker, The Law in John Calvin's Ethics in Calvin and Christian
Ethics (Peter De Klerk ed., Calvin Study Society, 1987) 19,20.
123 Aquinas, above n 26, I, q. 79, a.12-13; Irena Backus, 'Calvin's Concept of Natural
and Roman Law' [2003] 38 Calvin Theological Journal 7, 12.
124 Jean Bethke Elshtain, Sovereignty: God, State, and Self (Basic Books, 2008) 8, 17,
87-90; St. Augustine, above n 49, XIX; Calvin, above n 109, IV:xx.
125 Aquinas, above n 26, I-II, q. 94, a. 2.
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid I-II, q. 94, a.3; R.S. Clark, 'Calvin on the Lex Naturalis' (1998) 6(1-2) Stulos
Theological Journal 1, 4.
129 Aquinas, above n 26, I-II, q. 91, a. 3.
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good. This is not to say that the Thomist approach refutes the idea of God as the
ultimate source of the good, but rather that it has the unavoidable implication of
elevating the role that human beings play in the determination of what subject matter
constitutes natural law. In contrast, Calvin begins The Institutes of the Christian
Religion with the confident declaration that 'nearly all wisdom we possess, that is to
say, true and sound wisdom, consists of two parts: the knowledge of God and of
ourselves.' At first glance, the difference may appear trivial. But like isolated
organisms that multiply at an exponential rate in their habitat, the subtle differences
between Calvin and Thomist interpretations of natural law leave lasting impressions
when applied in context.
First of all, the obvious difference between the two approaches lies in the order.
To Aquinas, God is the end of human participation, whereas for Calvin God is the
starting point. Where Aquinas sees God as the 'unity of all goods', Calvin sees God as
the 'transcendent good', the normative means and the ideal end for which we strive.
Following from this then is Calvin's 'first principle' of natural law: that everything is
derived from a single and paramount 'good' which is God Himself.131 The second
component, inextricably related to the first, is that this 'good' is sourced in the unity of
God's nature.132 Based on this emphasis then is the fundamental natural law idea that
all other human laws are necessarily derivatives from a transcendent moral source.
According to Calvin, the first component of Christian natural law, that everything is
derived from God, asserts God's omnipotence, while the second component asserts
God's righteousness.
In dealing with the first component, Calvin gives prominence to the will of God.
This emphasis is reflected in his theological doctrines of predestination and election.
Calvin wrote that '[God's] will is, and rightly ought to be, the cause of all things that
are. For if it has any cause, something must precede it [and] this is unlawful toimg 133
imagine. Here, Calvin is asserting the eternal character of God. A sovereign God
transcends the limits of time and as such, has no beginning and no end. The name
Yahweh by which God makes Himself known to Moses 134 translates in Hebrew to
mean 'I am who I am' 13 5 and represents the transcendence marking the character of
130 Calvin, above n 109, Ii.1.
131 William F. Keesecker, The Law in John Calvin's Ethics, in Calvin and Christian
Ethics (Peter De Klerk ed, Calvin Study Society, 1987) 19, 20.
132 'Therefore since God claims to Himself the right of governing the world, a right
unknown to us, let it be our law of modesty and soberness to acquiesce in his
supreme authority, regarding his will as our only rule of justice, and the most perfect
cause of all things, - not that absolute will, indeed, of which sophists prate, when by a
profane and impious divorce, they separate his justice from his power, but that
universal overruling Providence from which nothing flows that is not right, though
the reasons thereof may be concealed.' See Calvin, above n 109, I.xvii.2.
133 Ibid III.xiv.21.
134 Ibid IV.xx. 15.
135 Exodus 3:14.
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God. 136 What does this mean for natural law? It means that there is an objective,
external standard by which all human beings are to be held accountable. This standard
is atemporal, self-evidently powerful and 'good' in and of itself.
Aquinas' conception of realism differs importantly from Calvin's. The
difference in their conceptions is most clearly manifested in Aquinas' position on the
'nature of the good'. Aquinas borrowed Aristotle's 'nomenclatures of causality' to
argue that the end for which a thing exists is the purpose for which it was built. In other
words, everything has been created by God with an in-built telos so that, once created,
God cannot further redefine 'what is good for the thing' .13 The assumption inherent in
this idea is that God's will for something corresponds with the real nature of the thing.
By this categorisation, the Thomist tradition was able to assert a rational universe in
which everything possesses the means to realise its own perfection. The ultimate
source of moral values is the natural state of the good as opposed to the will of God as
existing independently of the good.138
On this point, C. S. Lewis139 suggests that some goods are self-evident by virtue
of the 'Tao', functionally equivalent to Aquinas' first principles. In his words, any
attempt to 'debunk' the 'basic goods' requires the assumption that the critics are
speaking from a position itself immune from the 'debunking' process. The inquirers
are thus in no better a position to argue than those they are opposing. What is
backgrounded in the process of overstating the contention between the parties is
notable. The transcendent good loses its status and is reduced to a mere by-product of
human reason. Aquinas' exaggeration of the role of humans in their participation with
the 'basic goods' bears the potential of shifting the focus from the transcendent good to
human participants.
Once again, the significance is in the order. Aquinas' view upholds God's
character as the goal which humans may discover by observing the telos of everything
else. Augustine and Calvin stand at odds with this position by maintaining that God's
will is not discoverable by its conformity to the rational 'ecosystem of natures' but
rather exists as an independent and transcendent standard by which the good of
everything else may be judged. In essence, Calvin's rejection of Thomist realism is
136 See John Calvin, Commentary on the Gospel According to John 11-21 (1553) where
Calvin writes with respect to Augustine's realistic epistemology, 'Augustine, who is
excessively addicted to the philosophy of Plato, is carried along, according to custom,
to the doctrine of ideas; that before God made the world, he had the form of the
whole building conceived in his mind; and so the life of those things which did not
yet exist was in Christ, because the creation of the world was appointed in Him. But
how widely different this is from the intention of the Evangelist we shall immediately
see'.
137 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Stanford University Press, 2001) 773.
138 Bemoaning the loss of the 'sacramental perspective' in the modem world, the idea
that created objects find their reality and identity in God's word. See Hans Boersma,
Heavenly Participation (Win. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2011) 7.
139 C.S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man (Harper Collins Books, 1971) Ch. 1.
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because it contradicts the logos doctrine as revealed in the gospel of John, 'In the
beginning, there was the word and the word was with God and the word was God.'
140
According to this passage, Christ is not only a divine revelation of God's grace
but the self-evident embodiment of God's communication to humanity - His logic,
reason, clarity, order, definitions and concepts. 14 1 Reason is therefore God given and
divinely inspired, rather than representing a human path to understanding God and
humanity's own nature. In this way, while the Thomistic synthesis places heavy
emphasis on the 'proper good', Augustinian scholars promote the transcendence of
divine will as sourced in God's righteous character. Rather than ascribing something to
God's will because it is 'good', Calvin sees God's will and actions as existing
independent of an immanent standard of 'good' and flowing from the goodness of His
eternal character. 
142
With this background in mind, Calvin's account of natural law stands at odds
with at least two main features characterising Aquinas' thought. Firstly, Calvin does
not identify natural law with human reason's participation in God's eternal law.
143
Aquinas, in his eagerness to systemise Augustinian thought, maintained that the
deliverances of reason and divine revelation were consistent 144 and therefore frames
the relationship between humans and God as one of metaphysical participation.
However, according to Calvin, natural law is not the 'semi-autonomous mediator'
between God and humanity in general 145 but rather it is the embodiment of God's
merciful character and an example of common grace provided to all human beings.
3. The Unity of God
A second tension between the Thomist and Calvinist conceptions of natural law flows
on from the first. Calvin's natural law does not see divine revelation as the fruit of the
faculty of reason. 146 It is this component of Calvin's natural law theory - the source
of the good in God's unified transcendence - which explains the difference in
emphasis discussed above. It is by God's merciful nature that we humans may access
natural laws as 'written on our hearts' 147 regardless of our faith in Christ's salvation.
As we will see in more depth in the following section, the natural consequence of sin
was to impair human reason. Nonetheless, by God's mercy, shown through common
grace, humanity is given the freedom to access natural law to some extent.
140 Calvin, above n 134; John 1:1.
141 'Every good gift and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father
of lights with whom there is no variation or shadow due to change'. See James 1:17;
Chroust, above n 37, 57.
142 See generally C.S Lewis, above n 87.
143 Aquinas, above n 26, I-II, q. 91, a. 3-5.
144 Pryor, above n 117, 225, 225.
145 Backus, above n 123, 12.
146 Paul Helm, John Calvin's Ideas (Oxford University Press, 2004) 117.
147 John Calvin, Commentaries on Romans 11:14-15.
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By the same token, this freedom of choice holds humankind accountable to the
transcendent laws of God. In this way, by starting with and emphasising God as the
supreme source, Calvin's account of natural law reinforces the universal accountability
of humans to a transcendent moral standard. This emphasis on the transcendent nature
of normativity also informs Calvin's conception of God's nature and, in particular, his
rejection of voluntarism. It is impossible for God to act without rule or reason
according to the unity of His nature. This inner unity is what ensures that the natural
law is consistent not only with the divine will but also with divine wisdom.
148
The unity of God finds expression in the natural law inscribed on the hearts of
humans. This transcendent source of natural law inspires the workings of conscience
and human reason. Reason is not the starting point to grasping the natural law, but
represents a mechanism which God's common grace grants individuals in order to
access natural law. Calvin's rejection of human participation as a model for human
understanding of the good is therefore sourced in the notion that God's 'power is
always conjoined to His justice'. 49 Calvin maintains in this regard, 'It is easier to
dissever the light of the sun from its heat, or for that matter its heat from fire, than to
separate God's power from His righteousness.'1 50 It is the omnipotence of God's will
reconciled to His righteousness that become the bedrock for His providence.
Aquinas' emphasis on 'practical reason' and 'the nature of the good' leads him
to focus on the good in human nature.1 5 This effectively marginalises the role of God
in determining the content of natural law. On the other hand, Calvin's natural law
theory begins with the transcendent character of God and asserts His supremacy. This
means that regardless of the disfigurement to human nature as a consequence of the
fall, by God's providence alone we are able to state that human nature remains
sufficiently intact to allow for the flourishing of human society.1 2 By virtue of this
formulation, Calvin is able to maintain the transcendence of an independent moral
standard whilst remaining confident about its universal application to all humans at any
point in time.
B. HUMANITY'S TOTAL DEPRAVITY
We have seen that Calvin's emphasis on the supremacy of God is fundamental to his
understanding of natural law. We now embark on examining the reason for natural
law's paramountcy. Like two sides of the same coin, on the flipside of the notion of the
supremacy of God is the fact that nature does not possess ontological independence but
is always dependent on God's will. This is the critical point at which Calvin departs
from the doctrine of his Thomist predecessors. The Thomist notion of analogical entis
(the 'analogy of being') assumes that inherent good remains common to both God and
148 Calvin carefully maintained that in God's superiority to natural law his power is
always conjoined with his justice. See Schreiner, above n 118, 78.
149 Ibid.
150 John Calvin, Concerning the Eternal Predestination of God (1552) X. 12.
151 Aquinas, above n 26, I-II, q.91; Pryor, above n 117, 225, 236.
152 Pryor, above n 117, 225, 245.
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humanity. 153 In contrast, Calvin's emphasis on God's supremacy for his natural law
invariably foregrounds the contingent reality of the depravity of human nature.
Although, in the beginning, God created all things to be good, harmonious and
orderly, the result of original sin was to render nature at all times thereafter, in
whichever state, irreparably corrupted.1 54 Natural law cannot be derived from human
standards but is completely measured by and constituted in God's divine character.
1 55
This is the state of affairs on the kingdom of earth. And this is precisely the reason that
human nature and reason in their fallen state ought not to be conflated with the perfect
will of God.1 56 By following closely in Augustine's footsteps, humanity's total
depravity has become the cornerstone for Calvin's natural law theory.
1. The Source of Natural Law
Calvin situated his natural law in the broader context of God's sovereignty. He
identified natural law with both God's divine will and God's divine character. Up to
this point, Calvinist and Thomist natural law bear substantive semblance. Both appear
to have insisted on the inseparability of divine will and divine character. We might call
this the unity principle. 
157
Calvin's natural law thesis is fundamentally characterised by the doctrine of
total depravity based on Romans 3:10-12: 'None is righteous, no, not one: no one
understands; no one seeks for God. All have turned aside; together they have become
worthless, no one does good, not even one.' Calvin makes clear that the depravity of
humanity is extensive, even total in the sense that we are entirely incapable of self-
redemption. There are severe limitations on the 'human ability to correctly interpret
natural events and human history' . In conceiving human culpability and divine
sovereignty as congruent, Calvin openly prefers divine revelation over human reason
as the basis for his lex naturalis. This means that Calvin, like John Locke, 15 9 F. A.
153 Aquinas, above n 26, I-II, q.25, a.3; Ibid 237.
154 Calvin, above n 109, JJ.viii. 1.
155 Keesecker, above n 122, 19, 20.
156 See Susan E. Schreiner, The Theatre of His Glory: Nature and Natural Order in the
Thought of John Calvin (Labyrinth Press, 1991) 78.
157 'Therefore since God claims to Himself the right of governing the world, a right
unknown to us, let it be our law of modesty and soberness to acquiesce in his
supreme authority, regarding his will as our only rule of justice, and the most perfect
cause of all things, - not that absolute will, indeed, of which sophists prate, when by a
profane and impious divorce, they separate his justice from his power, but that
universal overruling Providence from which nothing flows that is not right, though
the reasons thereof may be concealed.' See Calvin above n 109, I.xvii.2
158 Pryor, above n 117, 225, 245.
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Hayek,160 and many other jurists who succeeded him, accepts the severely limited
character of human reason as the basic reality shaping legal and political institutions.
In contrast, Aquinas retains confidence in the natural abilities of humans to be
rational beings with a 'natural inclination to do good' (incinatio ad bonum) which he
claims to be a proper human attribute. According to Aquinas, humanity's natural
tendency to act according to reason as tethered to the 'common precepts' which guide
them to virtue together encompass the natural law. The doctrine of imputed
righteousness which is foundational to Calvin's theology is largely missing from
Aquinas' natural law161. Inherent to Calvin and Luther's epistemology was the
recognition that humanity could only ever become righteous through imputation
because righteousness could only emanate from the ultimate 'perfect good', that is,
God Himself. In contrast, the Thomist notion that all human beings have access to
eternal law, naturally, by virtue of their rationality, toys with the risk of conflating the
descriptive and normative dimensions of natural law. This conflation may, in turn,
culminate in the danger of confusing human reasonableness with transcendent
morality.
Although Thomist and Calvinist approaches to natural law all assert that humans
possess consciences by virtue of our nature - 'the divine law is etched upon human
hearts' 62  Calvin's commitment to the depravity doctrine means that he even
attributes 'limited human conscience' to God's grace. The discontinuity between
Thomist and Calvinist approaches to natural law is therefore a matter of degree
regarding humanity's potential to capitalise on our natural awareness and understand
the precise content of transcendent moral norms. Nonetheless, this slight difference has
far-reaching implications.
2. Human Nature and Natural Law
Calvin attributes our residual capacities to know and act upon the truth by exploring
our consciences to God's divine character expressed through common grace. 63 By
emphasising God's divine character as the source of our consciences, Calvin views the
conscience as a means of keeping us universally and ultimately accountable to God.
How, then, does Calvin deploy the concept of natural law?
Calvin premises the foundation of natural law on two grounds. Firstly, Calvin
asserts that natural law exists naturally. It is derived from human nature as part of
God's creation. In deriving natural law from human nature, as afforded to us by God,
Calvin does not consider the contingent fact of human sociability as directly relevant to
160 See Frederick A. Hayek, 'The Use of Knowledge in Society' (1945) 35 American
Economic Review 519.
161 Charles Raith III, 'Theology and Interpretation: The Case of Aquinas and Calvin on
Romans' (2011) International Journal of Systematic Theology 13-17.
162 Calvin, above n 109, I.iii.6; See Budziszewski, above n 30, 184-186.
163 Calvin, above n 109, II.ii. 16; See John Hesselink, Calvin's Concept of Natural Law
(Pickwick Publications, 1992) 70-7 1.
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the substance of the natural law. Calvin admits the obvious fact that humans are social
beings, but he does not accept the notion that humans can be credited with the creation
of natural law simply because they are social. Instead, he declares that God has
engraved the natural law upon the hearts of all humans, albeit to an imperfect extent.
This aspect of Calvin's theory therefore contrasts with jurists like Samuel Pufendorf
and Lon Fuller who view natural law mainly as a response to the challenge of social
coordination.
164
Second, natural law is not merely an order in the human mind, but reflects the
overall condition of fallen human nature. Rather than restricting natural law to the
faculty of human reason, Calvin makes it 'part and parcel' with human nature in its
entirety. 65 In other words, Calvinist natural law alludes to a state in which all human
beings find themselves. Not only was human reason corrupted when humans fell from
grace, but the whole natural order suffered as a result of the fall. 'Nature suffers the
disordering effects of sin and, while reason remains common to all people, it is
corrupted... the results of even correct judgments are vitiated by a corrupt will.' 166
Calvin therefore identifies the navigational core of human existence primarily with the
exercise of the will rather than with the human mind's participation in divine reason.
Calvin's emphasis on humanity's fall from grace leads him to conclude that
even where corrupt will results in correct judgment for a single matter, its
concupiscence overflows. Natural law for Calvin ultimately functions as God's bridle
for humankind, to curb our descent into bestiality. According to this postulation, the
role of natural law is (loosely) twofold:
To restrain humans from descent into bestiality; and,
To inspire humans to strive for the transcendent good.
Calvin's primary emphasis therefore falls upon the pursuit of the ultimate
transcendent good, whereas all other subsidiary goods are enjoyed incidentally to this
process. This contrasts with Aquinas' view, whereby human participation in the
several discrete modes of good enables us to progressively develop our understanding
of God through the exercise of our natural capacity for reason.
3. Descriptive and Normative Functions Of Natural Law
164 Samuel Pufendorf, De jure Naturae et gentium libri octo (Clarendon Press, 1934)
205; Fuller, above n 6.
165 Calvin appears to identify the heart more closely with the will. Not only does this
mean that natural law encompasses the sentimental capacity of human beings but it
also upholds it on equal terms with human rationality (Unlike Aquinas' emphasis
only on human reason). See generally Lewis, above n 137.
166 Gunther H. Haas, The concept of Equity in Calvin's Ethics (Wilfrid Laurier
University Press, 1997) 70.
167 Pryor, above n 117, 225, 251; Calvin, above n 109, JJ.iii.3.
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The emphasis on the total depravity of humans in Calvin's natural law theory renders
168humility the only appropriate response. Calvin, quoting Augustine, concludes that
'[b]ecause we do not know all the things which God in the best possible order does
concerning us, we act solely in good will according to the law' .169 Even before
addressing the full implications of the fall for the order of the human mind, we can see
Calvin turn his attention to the need for God's revealed law. Due to God's common
grace, by divine design, a minimal level of order has been provided to the world.
Luther inspired Calvin to a significant degree in this regard. Luther places 'rather more
emphasis on the extent to which man understands natural law was darkened by the fall'
and he 'tends in particular to emphasise the identity between natural law and
Decalogue or the two commandments of Christ'. Commenting on Romans 2.12 (sine
lege peribunt),1 70 Luther said
Natural law is impressed upon all people, Jews and Gentiles, and
to this law, all people are bound. Therefore the Lord says in
Matthew 7:12, 'Whatever you wish that men do to you, do so to
them: for this is the Law and the Prophets.' You see, the whole
transmitted law is nothing but the natural law, which cannot be
unknown to anyone and on account of which no one can be
excused. 171
Flowing from this descriptive analysis are three interdependent and critical
components of natural law:
Universal knowledge of right and wrong (conscience);
Universal inexcusability of every human (universal
accountability);
Through free will, God has equipped humans with the basic means to pursue
natural law and natural justice and this pursuit can, in turn, only be illuminated
fully by God through revelation (ie faith).
Calvin defines natural law by its purpose. He draws a clear separation between
the descriptive and normative components of natural law. 'The purpose of natural law
is to render men inexcusable. This would not be a bad definition: natural law is that
apprehension of conscience which distinguishes between the just and unjust, and
which deprives men of the excuse of ignorance, while it proves them guilty by their
own testimony' ,i 2 The conscience is not the standard by which fight and wrong is
adjudged but, rather, the instrument by which we may know and pursue justice and the
basis which renders all inexcusable from accountability.
168 Calvin, above n 109, II.ii.11.
169 Ibid I.xiii.2.
170 'For all who have sinned without the law will also perish without the law and all who
have sinned under the law will be judged by the law.' See Romans 2:12.
171 Martin Luther, above n 81, 25:180; Clark, above n 128, 11-12.
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This emphasis on a transcendent norm presupposes human limitation and
therefore properly warrants our humility. Instead of placing emphasis on individual
rights, Calvin's analysis acknowledges the eminence of individual responsibility.
Calvin's evaluation of the extent of corruption of human's natural capacities reveals
that human minds and abilities to reason are not completely incapacitated, but if left
unchecked are inclined to invariably go awry. '[E]ven though something of
understanding and judgment remains.., we shall not call a mind whole and sound that
is both weak and plunged into deep darkness.' 1 3 According to Calvin, sin renders the
human mind significantly incapacitated. By virtue of our inherent humanity, this line
of reasoning places emphasis on our duties to others before God, over an unhealthy
fixation on our own rights by means of self-justification.
4. The Extent of Impairment: Common Grace and Divine Grace
Calvin holds that the human will is extensively impaired but not to the extent that it is
reduced to less than animals.1 74 Though he emphasises the limits of humans' truth-
identifying capacity in general, the degree varies significantly with the object of
consideration.1 5 With respect to heavenly things, the impact of sin on human reason
becomes more pronounced than in regards to earthly things.1 6 The symptom of
degenerate human reason is erroneous judgments, but this propensity to error is not the
primary reason for futility. Rather, impiety is the main basis of reason's futility.
1 7 7
Depraved consciences when they reason invariably 'divert reason's power ofjudgment
from its divinely appointed end' . 17 8 The inherent fallibility of human reason is due to
the fallibility of humans themselves and not merely to defects in their reasoning
processes. Human reason therefore can only achieve an imperfect understanding of the
good.
Calvin, although remaining realistic about the limitations of natural law absent
the recognition of God's 'divine grace', 17 9 does not preclude the role of natural law
based on common grace. 80 Though commentators like Hittinger lament the limited
force of natural law outside a Christian theological discourse,181 this is not necessarily
true. A closer look at Calvin's jurisprudence should reveal that civil laws are required
to bridle humanity's inherent depravity. Civil laws are thus grounded in natural law in
a descriptive sense. This is because civil laws ought to only be valid insofar as they are
consistent with the moral requirements of natural law.
173 Ibid II.ii.12.
174 Ibid II.ii. 17.
175 Ibid II.ii.13.
176 Ibid II.ii.18.
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The idea of common grace further distinguishes Calvin's natural law tradition
from the Thomist tradition. 'God by his providence bridles perversity of nature that it
may not break forth into action; but he does not purge it within.' 18 2 What Calvin means
by this is that the redemptive nature of common grace is subject to obvious limits. 83
Without paying homage to God, the human instinct of self-preservation is not
sufficient to enable us to reach moral perfection 84 In other words, God's common
grace governs the worst of human corruption, acts as the minimal check on human
arbitrariness, but does no more. Positive laws, unless they appeal to a higher law,
cannot expect to remain morally sound. In this context, natural law has a critical role to
play.
C. THE UNITY OF THE TWO KINGDOMS
Augustine emphasises that we must always affirm the supremacy of the heavenly
kingdom over the earthly kingdom, reflecting the ultimate supremacy of divine
authority over all forms of earthly authority. 18 5 The earthly authority, in this sense,
always owes its force to the extent to which it is based on divine will. It is important to
bear in mind that the distinction between the heavenly and earthly kingdoms is quite
different from the separation of church and state. 18 6 Church and state are both human
institutions with a role to play in governing human communities. Ultimately, however,
both church and state are elements of the earthly kingdom and must be conceived as
limited and directed by conformity with a transcendent moral norm. Calvin postulated
that God is sovereign: he rules both church and state and in this sense both are entities
predicated upon His authority. The earthly kingdom, thus conceived, falls under God's
transcendent authority and therefore lies within the broader heavenly kingdom (as
illustrated by fig. 1).
Fig. 1
182 Calvin, above n 109, 1.iii.3.
183 For more comprehensive discussion of Calvin's views on 'common grace' see
Herman Kuiper, Calvin and Common Grace (Smitter Book co., 1928).
184 Calvin, above n 109, JJ.ii.24.
185 St. Augustine, above n 49, XIV:28.
186 VanDrunen, above n 39, 113.
(2014) 39 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy
The distinction Calvin emphasises most strongly in this context is a distinction
between spiritual and natural laws. His separation of the Two Kingdoms is significant
mainly in explaining the theological requirement for conscientious living in a fallen
world, all the while keeping the concerns of the heavenly kingdom at the fore of one's
mind. In this sense, the partition between the Two Kingdoms is not spatial or even
temporal. Rather, they often exhibit fluidity in transition and are definitely not
mutually exclusive. 18 7 For one thing, the post-Eden state of the world not only
encompasses the fall of human beings, but alludes to the state of an entire natural
order. In this sense, natural laws encompass the reality of a fallen state, as well as
moral laws pertaining to this order.
In Romans 8:22, Paul states, 'For we know that the whole creation has been
groaning together in the pains of childbirth until now'."' This demonstrates that the
fallen state of humankind extends to the whole of 'creation'. By comparison, spiritual
laws represent Christ's work of redemption through which the pursuit of the kingdom
of heaven is made possible. The phrase 'until now' in the verse demonstrates that
redemption is in a state of flux. In this way, Calvin's natural law can be seen as
characterised by a forward-moving motion. Fixing our eyes on the kingdom of heaven,
believers are encouraged to run 'forward' mindful of the 'author' and 'perfector' of our
faith. 8 9 A sharp antithesis between the Two Kingdoms fails to encapsulate the
forward-moving character or continuum inherent in Calvin's natural law as well as the
role he envisages for it in the present.
Thus, the 'Two Kingdoms' language employed by both Calvin and Augustine
does not so much refer to two separate realms in spatial terms1 90 but alludes to the
'twofold form of governance' by God over the conduct of believers in whom the two
jurisdictions co-exist.1 91 Reformist scholars like VanDrunen may have mistakenly
interpreted Calvin's 'Two Kingdoms' doctrine in terms of the inward and external
dichotomy. 192 The internal and external dichotomy has been used by some scholars of
the Two Kingdoms theory to discriminate between the inward spiritual obedience of
believers to God and the external obedience by them to the civil government.
However, this dichotomy is misleading.
187 G. Joseph Gatis, 'The Political theory of John Calvin' in Timothy J. Denny and Gary
P. Stewart (eds), Politics and Public Policy: A Christian Response (Kregel
Publications, 2000) 97, 97-98.
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190 Cornel Venema, 'The Restoration of All Things to Proper Order: An Assessment of
the "Two Kingdoms/Natural Law" Interpretation of Calvin's Public Theology' in
Ryan C. McIlhenny (ed), Kingdoms Apart: Engaging in Two Kingdoms Perspective
(P&R Publishing, 2012) 3, 13-14.
191 Calvin, above n 109, III.xix.15.
192 '[J]t is immediately evident that this two~bld jurisdiction cannot be neatly divided, as
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on the one hand, and other institutions and aspects of human life and culture,
especially the state, on the other. 'See Venema, above n 187, 3, 14.
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The Two Kingdoms doctrine is better understood in terms of the difference
between natural and spiritual laws with God at their helm - believers are subject to
both the laws of fallen nature and the laws of Christ's redemptive grace. The difference
is that God governs these two spheres differently.1 93 Insofar as this separation goes, the
'Two Kingdoms' terminology is a misnomer. By distinguishing between spiritual and
natural laws, Calvin is acknowledging the unavoidable overlap between the external
and internal spheres under the unity of God's transcendent authority (what I described
above as the 'unity principle'). 194
1. Aquinas' Grace-Nature Structure
Aquinas' separation of eternal law, divine law, natural law and human law fails
to capture the multi-dimensional nature of the relationship between the Two Kingdoms
as explained above. Aquinas seems to understand the distinction between the divine
realm (governed by God's will) and the human realm (governed by reason) in terms of
a division and hierarchy (fig. 2).
Fig.2
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For example, Aquinas defines eternal laws in terms of 'God's providence and
wisdom'1 95 and the participation of all creatures with it in a way that is befitting their
nature. In this way, some of Aquinas' statements regarding the eternal law make his
version of natural law appear exclusively about reason 196 in which grace plays no part.
The separation of the 'Two Kingdoms' into a 'grace-nature' structure involves a
degree of arbitrariness. The differences in Calvin's and Aquinas' views on the
separation between natural and spiritual laws1 97 have far-reaching implications for their
natural law positions. An effective example is the different relationship of love and
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natural law as accepted by the two theologians.19 To Aquinas, love, unlike human
reason, is an essentially supernatural virtue which is attainable not by nature, but only
through revelation by grace. In his view, the natural law includes reason while spiritual
laws are primarily associated with the heavenly life (where virtues such as 'love'
belong).
In this way, Aquinas overstates humans' capacity to 'reason' at the expense of
highlighting individuals' dependency on and accountability to God. Calvin, on the
other hand, upholds love as being prescriptive to his natural law, sourced in the unity
of a perfect God. Further, the primacy of the relationship between God and individuals
means that all humanity ought to be pursuing as well as presently engaging with this
virtue.1 99 Calvin's focus on spiritual and natural laws, in this context, provides for a
more accurate picture of the oscillating role of natural law between the descriptive and
normative standards. In this sense, contrary to first impressions, Calvin's Two
Kingdoms doctrine renders his natural law substantively richer than Aquinas' more
rigid grace-nature structure.
2 The Concept of 'Authority'
Calvin's version of the Two Kingdoms doctrine is usefully understood in terms
of a distinction between power and authority (or de facto and legitimate authority). If
power' is defined as strength relative to another entity, then 'authority' is power
legitimated by a valid source. In practice, 'authority' serves to limit the power to the
bounds of what is legitimate. A power that is bereft of authority is merely de facto.
According to the second passage in the Institutes 4.20.1, Calvin states:
Whoever knows how to distinguish between body and soul,
between this present fleeting life and that future eternal life, will
without difficulty know that Christ's spiritual Kingdom and the
civil jurisdiction are things completely distinct. Since, then, it is
a Jewish vanity to seek and enclose Christ's Kingdom within the
elements of this world, let us rather ponder that what Scripture
clearly teaches is a spiritual fruit, which we gather from Christ's
grace; and let us remember to keep within its own limits all that
freedom which is promised and offered to us in him.200
When Calvin speaks of 'Jewish vanity' in this context, he points to the error
committed by religious leaders who conflate 'earthly' power with 'spiritual authority'.
The spiritual fruit necessary to enter into the kingdom of heaven is only possible
through faith in Christ's redemptive power. In this sense, the heavenly kingdom
represents the ideal ends for which the whole world ought to be striving but attainment
of which is only possible through God.
198 Ibid.
199 Ibid.
200 Calvin, above n 109, IV.xx. 1.
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Accordingly, as the only true source of power is God, the exercise of power is
'authorised' only insofar as it is consistent with the spiritual laws. Calvin seeks to
restore all things to their proper order through the idea of the sovereignty of God.
Jesus' famous riposte to the Pharisees' question as to whose 'authority' they ought to
obey, 'Render to Caesar what is Caesar's, and to God what is God's' ,21 can be
understood in this light. Calvin interprets Jesus as emphasising that believers have a
legitimate obligation to obey the civil magistrates, but only out of reverence to a
sovereign God who appointed them in the first place. In other words, 'earthly laws' are
only legitimate insofar as they are in line with the 'divine laws', emphasising once
again that all things stand by God's sovereign will alone.
As Paul puts it, 'Do not conform to the pattern of this world, but be transformed
by the renewing of your mind. Then you will be able to test and approve what God's
will is - his good, pleasing and perfect will'.202 Such verses capture the dimensions of
Calvin's natural law and give sense to his 'Two Kingdoms' doctrine. Civil magistrates
have the task of ensuring that both tables of the law - the first table dealing with the
service and worship of God and the second table addressing the mutual service of all
human beings to each other - are honoured and obeyed.20 3 In this way, Calvin's
natural law prescribes that both 'earthly' and 'heavenly' powers, both church and state,
both the internal and the external are all subject to God's transcendent authority.
Calvin limits the authority of the civil magistrate in recognition of the risk that it may
usurp the distinctive prerogatives of the spiritual kingdom.
V. Implications for constitutionalism
This section aims to show how the normative foundations of Calvin's natural law
position provide support for constitutionalism. We noted above that the vexed question
of abuse of power may be a result of conflating power, in the sense of strength, with
the separate concept of authority, a legitimating force which in turn presupposes a
transcendent norm. Calvin resolves this issue by depositing a transcendence and moral
validity in the 'sovereignty of God', thereby neatly reconciling the alleged
'discrepancy' characterising his natural law thesis - the simultaneous insistence on
the depravity of all humanity and the universal human accountability to a superior
moral norm. Similarly, the philosophy of constitutionalism demands that the 'powers'
of rulers be subject to limits. Another way to see this is that there is a requirement that
the powers themselves must derive their authority from 'enduring laws which the
201 Mark 12:17; Matthew 22:21; Also see John Calvin, Calvin's Commentaries on Mark
12:17 xxi, where he says, 'It lays down a clear distinction between spiritual and civil
government, in order to inform us that outward subjection does not prevent us from
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rulers themselves cannot abrogate'.2O4 As such, 'constitutionalism is inextricably
associated with the ideal of the Rule of Law'.2O5
A. THE RULE OF LAW
In one sense, the 'Rule of Law' refers to the existence of an authoritative legal standard
which is used to determine the validity of all positive laws and, ultimately, constrain
206the behaviour of lawmakers and their subjects. In another sense, it refers to
substantive requirements to which the power of all lawmakers and the laws they are
credited with drafting are subject.20 In this way, the rule of law covers two primary
conceptions: firstly, a formalist or 'thin' definition focusing on procedural limitations;
and, secondly, a substantive or 'thick' definition importing notions of rights or justice.
Fuller's 'internal morality of law' is a useful starting point for a working
definition of the rule of law. Although some have disputed the exhaustive nature of
Fuller's formal requirements for law, there seems to be a general consensus that his
'eight principles of legality' successfully capture the essence of the Rule of Law,20 8 at
least in the formal sense. Fuller identifies these eight requirements of the rule of law inO L w 2 0 9
his work, The Morality of Law, through the allegory of King Rex by illustrating the
eight ways one can fail to make law. The internal morality of law is comprised of
'generality', 'promulgation', 'prospectivity', 'clarity', 'consistency', 'observability',
'constancy' and 'congruence'. Fuller argues that these requirements constitute the
internal morality of law, absent which the law in question cannot be properly deemed
valid.210 As each one of these requirements is considered integral to the concept of law
itself, a failure with respect to any one of them results in a complete failure to make
law.211
Critics argue that the 'eight requirements of law' do not require that the
substance of the law be morally sound.212 In other words, a morally repugnant law may
potentially satisfy the 'internal morality of law' and may thus, be recognised as a valid
law. Fuller further sub-divides the internal morality of law into moralities of duty and
aspiration. 21 His morality of duty represents the minimum formal requirements
204 Ratnapala, above n 1, 1, 5.
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governing the process of lawmaking.214 Conforming to the morality of duty does not
attract praise; however, a failure to conform will result in criticism and potentially legal
invalidity.' 5 On the other hand, the morality of aspiration represents the higher ideals
towards which legislators ought to aspire. They represent normative aims, achievement
of which results in praise, while failures do not generally lead to criticisms.
Calvin's natural law theory is compatible with both the broader and narrower
conceptions of the rule of law. Not only does the core of Calvin's natural law embody
the sovereignty of God which subjects all humans to the same transcendent standard,
but it also includes the Two Kingdoms doctrine which recognises as valid only those
earthly laws that maintain consistency with spiritual laws. In the formal sense, the rule
of law represents a set of requirements that subjects the power of lawmakers and the
laws that they make to external scrutiny. This narrow conception of the rule of law is
perfectly compatible with Calvin's natural law. It is given normative support by
Calvin's strong emphasis on the fallibility of human rulers and the need to subject
them to limits in accordance with the conditional nature of their authority.216
The formal rule of law requirements therefore correspond to Calvin's natural
law in the mutual acknowledgement of the need for an independent measure by which
every power should be assessed. Both the rule of law and Calvin's natural law are
measures that are independent of human power. The reason for this independence, as
noted above, is anchored in the shared doctrine of human limitations. James Madison,
one of the founding fathers of the United States Constitution, borrows the words of
Calvin in declaring the principles for establishing a federal govenent, 'If men were
angels, no government would be necessary' .217 It is useful then to hypothesise that if
humans were infallible, neither the governed nor the governors would need to be
checked. However, as things stand, humanity requires transcendent and independent
measures like the rule of law. That the rule of law is part of political philosophy in
constitutional democracies today largely confirms the acceptance of the doctrine of
human fallibility which is integral to Calvin's natural law, although contemporary
authors may not give the idea a theological basis.
Further, the transcendence characterising natural law authority would require it
to surpass the formal requirements of the rule of law and contain within it, a normative
force. The forward-looking momentum of Calvin's natural law both in time and
substance bears this normative character. It embodies the 'external morality of law'
that Fuller describes but upon which he fell short of elaborating. Calvin's natural law
fills in this gap. The human obligation of mutual service and support in the sight of
God becomes the starting point for 'national public policy in any given period and
214 Crowe, above n 65, 68.
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culture'. 218 Both Calvin and Luther held that the substance of the law or 'scheme of
equity' built into the Mosaic Law is reflective of universal human morality. 219 The
substance of the Mosaic Law acts as a useful guide to the norms of equity that remain
common to all legal systems at all times. 'Hence, this equity, alone must be the goal
and rule and limit of all laws'. 2 Calvin's natural law, therefore, provides the moral
compass that we have been afforded by common grace and our consciences to bind us
equally together toward a shared conception of justice.
B. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
Calvin's natural law theory also evidences strong support for the second pillar of
constitutionalism introduced at the beginning of this paper: namely, the separation of
powers. We can understand the Calvinist foundations of this idea by drawing on F.A.
Hayek's theory of 'spontaneous order'. In Hayek's work on law and economics in
particular, there are remarkable echoes of Calvin's natural law themes, especially with
regard to the doctrine of human fallibility and its implications for constitutional design.
Hayek pointed to limited capacity of humans to know and therefore organise the world
.. .. 221
around them. Calvin, on the other hand, stressed moral depravity. Nonetheless, the
stress on human weakness led both to argue for limited government in similar ways.
Hayek opens his influential article, 'The Use of Knowledge in Society, with the
following conditional statements:
If we possess all the relevant information, if we can start out
from a given system of preferences and if we command
complete knowledge of available means, the problem which
remains is purely one of logic.
222
He was observing that the economic problem was not one sensibly resolvable by
deliberate and rational planning but, rather, a problem arising from the impossibility of
any human being achieving perfect knowledge.
Economics, for Hayek, is a 'spontaneous order'. As such, the iterative process
integral to 'spontaneous orders' of this kind necessitates a presumption that any
capacity of individuals to access knowledge is severely limited. Contrary to the
pervasive dogma that scientific knowledge is the 'sum of all knowledge', Hayek insists
that 'the knowledge of the particular circumstances, of time and place' cannot be
mastered by a single individual. Rather than crediting humans with the capacity to
determine the most efficient allocation of resources, Hayek defers to the spontaneous
forces of the market for the answer to economic efficiency.
218 Mark W. Karlberg, 'Reformation Politics: The Relevance of OT Ethics in Calvinist
Political Theory', (1986) 29(2) Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 179,
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Hayek acknowledges what I would call the positivist seduction223 - the idea
that humans want to believe that they have an unrealistic degree of control. If we were
interested in pursuing a real solution to social problems, we would first need to
acknowledge the impossibility of obtaining perfect knowledge in any engineered sort
of way. A single person at a single point in time cannot conceivably know exactly
where goods are to be allocated for maximum efficiency. In fact, the more knowledge
that is concentrated in a few means greater risk of abuse. According to Hayek, then,
without acknowledging the reality of human limitations, we cannot hope to strive for a
more efficient allocation of resources.
Calvin in his Sermons on Galatians hypothesises:
If we were like angels, blamelessly and freely able to exercise
perfect self-control, we would not need rules or regulations.
Why then, do we have so many laws and statutes? Because of
man's wickedness, for he is constantly overflowing with evil;
224this is why a remedy is required.
In a similar way to Hayek (albeit for different reasons), Calvin sees the
descriptive position of the law and everything else as being one of limited individual
capacity. The fall was responsible not only for corrupting the whole natural order but
also for impairing the human conscience and mind. If we, by succumbing to the
'positivist seduction', refuse to admit our realistic limitations, how can we then hope to
architect a proper moral and legal system? Calvin therefore presupposes the depravity
of humanity and mounts this as the descriptive foundation for the normative trajectory
of his natural law.
Similar to his economic theory, Hayek's account of the common law method
also acknowledges the limitation of a few individual lawmakers at any single point in
time. Hayek advocates a 'grassroots' approach to social change, captured in his notion
of law as a form of cosmos or evolved social order. In his view, the cosmos approach is
better facilitated by the common law rather than legislation which characteristically
takes the form of a taxis or regulations imposed from the 'top down' .225 Conferring
power to a few individuals to deliberately solve potential problems sits uncomfortably
with the notion that humans are inherently fallible. On the other hand, the common law
evolves by 'subsuming the perceptions and interpretations contemporaneous at that
223 Calvin, above n 109 II.ii.1 1 affirming the words of St. Augustine, 'If you ask me
[what is the first, second, and third precept] of the Christian religion, I will answer,
first, second and third, humility... By humility', Calvin writes, '[Augustine] means
not when a man, with a consciousness of some virtue refrains from pride, but when
he truly feels that he has no refuge but in humility'.
224 John Calvin, Sermon on Galatians 3:19-20: "The Many Functions of God's Law"
(1558).
225 Crowe, above n 65,111.
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time into every judgment in the long series of precedents'.226 In the common law,
judges are restricted to responding to individual cases rather than attempting pre-
emptive solutions to potential problems. They are limited, not only to the cases that
come before them, but to building on the long line of examples that precede them. The
doctrine of stare decisis therefore represents judge-made law as being a 'product of
human action but not of human design'. 227 In this way, Hayek indirectly alerts us to the
inherent risks involved in concentrating power in a few. The common law is based on
the recognition that the knowledge available to individuals at any one point in time is
substantially limited.228
Like Hayek, Calvin's emphasis on checks and balances stems from his
recognition of human limitations. His depravity of humanity doctrine is the building
block for his safeguard against tyranny - the separation of powers. Calvin viewed
tyranny as the 'demon that stalks the state, seeking to possess it'. 229 He believed
tyranny was made possible by the corrupted nature of humanity and he abhorred it
because it reflected a desire to usurp the sovereignty of God. The idea of checks and
balances riddles Calvin's works. In Calvin's thinking, a mechanism of 'fraternal
correction' which allowed mutual admonition, thereby providing checks and balances
against individual 'indulgences' 23 0 (which he derived from 2 Thessalonians 3:15) was
so valuable that he had it incorporated into the Constitution of the Church of Geneva.
In his words:
Men's inadequacies and vices make it safer and better that the
many hold sway. In this way rulers may help each other, teach
and admonish one another, and if one asserts himself unfairly,
they may act in concert to censure, repressing his wilfulness
(libido)21
God uses the conscience, extensively impaired as it were, to bridle humanity's
perpetual lust for power. In this way, we see the foundational semblances between
Calvin's depravity of humanity doctrine and Hayek's belief in individual limitations.
This is not the same as saying that Calvin would accept the evolutionary theory
underpinning Hayek's philosophy. Calvin himself acknowledges the correctness of
some contributions made by secular philosophers, but caveats this wisdom, drawing a
distinction between the 'correctness' of their precepts and the normativity of their
226 Jonathan Crowe and Constance Lee, 'Law as Memory' (Paper presented the Law and
Literature Conference, Department of Law, Australian National University, 4
December 2013) 6-7.
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conclusions. In the same way, we may utilise Hayek's philosophy in regards to
'human limitations' without need for a wholesale acceptance of its methodological
underpinnings. To the extent that both recognise as reality the fact that humans are
entities subject to 'limitations', the support Hayek's philosophy provides for Calvinist
natural law is significant.
C. FEDERALISM
In addition to the separation of powers that distributes power horizontally between the
separate arms of government, federalism ensures that legislative power is also
vertically distributed between the regional and federal governments. Continuous with
both Calvin and Hayek's descriptive position regarding human limitations, federalism
was designed to further disperse power to combat the foreseeable tyranny
characterising 'top-down' systems of government.
Modern federalism, including Australian federalism, traces an unbroken line
from the Reformation back to the ancient Jewish system of covenant.2 1' The covenant
form of government, sourced in divine revelation, was unique to the Jewish people.234
The linguistic origin of the term 'federal' comes from the Latin foedus meaning
covenant.235 In turn, the term covenant is derived from the Hebrew word meaning 'to
sever'. 236 Thus, federalism is basically a contract between a lesser and greater power,
pursuant to which the sovereignty of the lesser power is preserved, a system of 'self-
rule plus shared rule.' 237 The founders of the United States Constitution referred to
federalism as a 'confederacy' or 'a league of friendship.' 238 'A covenantal politics,
then, is directed simultaneously toward linking people and communities as partners in
common tasks and allowing them space in which to be free' .2 39 Thus, in the Ancient
Jewish constitutional practice, both covenant and federal theology were designed to
increase the security through confederation and simultaneously facilitate the liberty of
humankind.
In respect of the federal model, the congruence between Calvin's theology and
constitutionalism is even more pronounced. Calvin sees the institution of 'fraternal
correction [as] vital in the context of human depravity, to check and balance humans'
232 Ibid II.ii.15.
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Federalism (Lexington Books, 2000) Ch. 1.
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arrogance'.2 40 Federalism basically involves a 'contractual linkage' between the state
and the Commonwealth which provides for a vertical decentralisation of power. This
linkage is characterised by a sense of permanence. In other words, the federal
arrangement is one that is ideally 'unchangeable' and 'irremovable'. This subverts the
potential of indulgences by a fallible sovereign entity against its subjects. On this note,
Calvin remarks:
In as much as God had given them the use of the franchise, the
best way to preserve their liberty for ever was by maintaining a
condition of rough equality, lest a few persons of immense
wealth should oppress the general body.24'
Calvin further recognised the value of self-rule and local governance in
emphasising individual conscience over the exercise of centralised power. His
preference for decentralised modes of church governance reflected his theological
242
stance on the direct relationship between God and individual humans.
In Australia, federalist concerns are both implicitly 243 and explicitly enshrined in
a written constitution. Notwithstanding Isaacs J's insistence of 'parliamentary
sovereignty' in the Engineers decision, federalism was not completely extinguished.
The clear federal division of powers that the framers envisaged for Australia is
structurally represented in the Constitution itself. For example, s 51 lists areas of
legislative power which are to be concurrently exercised by both state and
Commonwealth governments and, in the event that the laws conflict, a provision in s
109 resolves the conflict in favour of the Commonwealth law. The remaining powers
not allocated to the Commonwealth are retained by the states pursuant to s 107.
Furthermore, the High Court continues to recognise the doctrine of
intergovernmental immunities (albeit in a weaker form than in the early years of the
High Court)244 as an in-built constitutional limitation on the Commonwealth
Parliament. This doctrine serves to invalidate any Commonwealth laws which in effect
or on their face discriminate against a state or between states or otherwise 24 5 impose a
burden that impairs the states' ability to function as autonomous governments.246
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The Convention debates in Australia show that its Constitution was greatly
influenced by those of the United States and Switzerland.24 The notion of federalism
is an American import.24' Madison, who is considered one of the most influential
founding fathers of the United States Constitution, appears to have relied on Calvinist
theology to lend support to the foundational notions of the separation of powers and
the rule of law. In the Federalist Papers, Madison echoes Calvin insofar as he contends:
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If
angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls
on government would be necessary. In framing a government
which is to be administered by men over men, the great
difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to
control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control
itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary
control on the government; but experience has taught mankind
249the necessity of auxiliary precautions.
Madison also attempts to draw the contours around federal and state relations:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the
Federal Government, are few and defined. Those which are to
remain in the State Governments are numerous and indefinite.
The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as
war, peace, negociation [sic], and foreign commerce; with which
last the power of taxation will for the most part be connected.
The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the
objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the
lives, liberties and properties of the people; and the internal
250order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.
The implied doctrine of reserved powers in Australia (insisted upon by the early
High Court, but overridden by the Engineers decision) is derived from passages such
as this. However, the claim that fundamental doctrines of Calvinist natural law
underpin the architecture of the American and Australian Constitutions is different
from claiming that the Constitutions are established upon Calvinist natural law or
indeed any other one philosophy. Even stripped of its original biblical federal covenant
definitions, modem federalism's congruence with Calvin's natural law theory arises
out of humankind's need to enter into some sort of covenant as consequence of
humanity's fallible and limited character. Thus, despite the Enlightenment and its
251
emphasis on the potential of human reason, concepts like federalism continue to
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mandate by their very substance that every society 'be knit together by some covenant,
either express or implied'. 2
VI. Conclusion
We have seen that Aquinas defines natural law in a metaphysical sense as an objective
set of precepts given by God that humans can then enunciate and apply to individual
actions as a result of reason.2 His painstaking endeavour to furnish the precise
contents of natural law contrasts sharply with Calvin's project.25 4 Rather than pursuing
a formulaic exposition, Calvin expends his energies in defining the role of natural law.
Accordingly, natural law is a standard God places on human conscience. This order
emphasises accountability and inexcusability in relation to God. Underlying this
accountability is every human's dependence on God. 5
Calvin's natural law is consistent with the view that urges moderation on a
sovereign. Humanity's vices make it safer that power be distributed between many
rather than concentrated in a few. Calvin's staunch conviction in the total depravity of
humankind provides a descriptive foundation for his natural law that maintains
congruence with the presuppositions accepted by the likes of Augustine, Montesquieu,
Madison, Fuller, Locke and Hayek.
To Calvin, both civil and spiritual laws are subject to the ultimate sovereignty of
God. Calvin returns to Augustine's notion of the transcendence of God over all things
and the universality of human accountability in the light of the law written on our
hearts. All laws - whether positive or natural, civil or spiritual - derive from God
and are subject to his authority. Any power bereft of God's transcendent authority fails
to be a law in the moral sense. Rather than God being the unity of all basic goods, He
is the ultimate good from which all things are derived. Calvin does not vacillate or
compromise on this point in order that humans are without excuse.
It is curious that despite modem secularism's rejection of theological
considerations, the Calvinist division between spiritual and civil laws continues to
provide the foundation for current constitutional norms. Calvin's theology may appear
outmoded to some, but as an examination of the three pillars of constitutionalism -
the separation of powers, federalism and the rule of law - has demonstrated, his
natural law theory remains congruent with, if not central to, modem constitutional
practice.
More fundamentally, the transcendent and forward-looking character of
Calvinist natural law emphasises the higher morality that rulers ought always to
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pursue. This emphasis on transcendent norms gives Calvinist natural law an important
role in jurisprudence and constitutionalism. It is a reminder that the power of human
rulers is not self-validating and should always be viewed as pursuing a higher aim.
